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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Jared Thompson appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for 
involuntary manslaughter with a weapons enhancement. On appeal, he argues that 
there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to sustain his conviction and that the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On December 16, 2011, Thompson and three of his friends, Michael Blair, Kristin 
Crull, and Khali Jones, went out drinking. (Tr., p.287, L.10 - p.288, L.4; p.289, L.23 -
p.291, L.23; p.416, Ls.9-14.) They all drank a lot. (See Id.) During the evening Mr. 
Blair and Ms. Crull began arguing, and the friends decided to go home. (Tr., p.295, 
Ls.7-11; p.416, Ls.15-20.) On the way home Mr. Blair and Ms. Crull continued to argue. 
(Tr., p.296, Ls.13-22; p.416, Ls.21-22.) Thompson threatened to shoot one of them if 
they did not shut up. (Tr., p.297, Ls.9-12; p.417, Ls.2-5) He then pulled out a loaded 
gun, chambered a round, and, holding the gun in his hand, pointed it toward the back of 
the truck. (Tr., p.297, L.17 - p.298, L.10.) Mr. Blair placed his hand atop Thompson's 
and put his mouth over the barrel of the gun. (Tr., p.300, Ls.15-22; p.417, Ls.6-11.) It 
fired, killing Mr. Blair. (Tr., p.300, L.23 - p.301, L.1; p.320, Ls.5-22; p.417, Ls.11-12; 
p.557, Ls.11-17.) 
The state charged Thompson with involuntary manslaughter with a deadly 
weapons enhancement for recklessly, carelessly or negligently producing the death of 
Mr. Blair with the gun. (R., pp.45-49.) Thompson stood trial. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the charge of involuntary manslaughter and the 
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enhancement. (R., pp.201-02.) The district court entered judgment against Thompson 
and imposed a sentence of 15 years with five years fixed. (R., pp.224-26.) Thompson 
filed a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of sentence. ("Motion for Rule 35," filed April 
11, 2013 (Augmentation)), which the district court denied ("Order Denying the 
Defendant's Motion for Rule 35," filed April 22, 2013 (Augmentation)). 
Thompson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment. (R., pp.227-29.) 
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ISSUES 
Thompson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Thompson's conviction for involuntary 
manslaughter because there was insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. 
Thompson, a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, 
following his conviction for involuntary manslaughter and a weapons 
enhancement? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Thompson's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Was substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury could 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson was guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter? 
Has Thompson failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial Supports The Jury's Conclusion That 
Thompson Was Guilty Of Involuntary Manslaughter 
A. Introduction 
The state charged Thompson with involuntary manslaughter and a deadly 
weapons enhancement. (R., pp.45-49.) After his trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts 
on both parts. (R., pp.201-02.) On appeal, Thompson argues that there was 
insufficient evidence for a jury to convict him of voluntary manslaughter. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-14.) Review of the trial record, however, demonstrates that the jury's verdict 
is supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603,607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the 
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607. The facts, and inferences to be 
drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. kl In 
determining whether sufficient evidence to support a conviction was presented at trial, 
the Court reviews the evidence that was actually presented to the jury without regard to 
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its ultimate admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
C. Thompson's Conviction For His Involuntary Manslaughter Of Michael Blair Is 
Supported By The Evidence Presented At Trial 
The evidence presented at trial clearly supports the jury's verdict convicting 
Thompson of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is defined as "the 
unlawful killing of a human being:" 
in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any unlawful act, other than 
those acts specified in section 18-4003(d), Idaho Code; or in the 
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful 
manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or in the operation of 
any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent manner 
which produces death. 
I.C. § 18-4006(2). After threatening to shoot his passengers if they did not shut up, 
Thompson pulled out a handgun, intentionally chambered a round and cocked the gun, 
and then pointed the loaded gun in the direction of his passengers riding in the back of 
his pickup truck. (Tr., p.297, L.9- p.298, L.10; p.417, Ls.2-7.) Those actions constitute 
"the operation of [a) firearm ... in a reckless, careless or negligent manner." That 
Thompson was intoxicated at the time (see Tr., p.262, L.10 - p.263, L.5) only adds to 
his reckless, careless or negligent behavior. Thompson killed Mr. Blair when the gun he 
held in his hand was fired. (Tr., p.557, Ls.11-17.) The evidence therefore shows that 
Thompson was guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 
On appeal, Thompson argues that the state failed to prove that his reckless, 
careless or negligent operation of a firearm caused Mr. Blair's death. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.9-13.) Thompson asserts that this Court must apply to involuntary manslaughter 
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cases the causation standard for restitution cases articulated in State v. Corbus, 150 
Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398 (2011 ). (Appellant's brief, p.10, n.4.) Thompson's 
argument fails on two grounds. First, involuntary manslaughter's element of "produces 
death" does not require the state to prove civil causation. Second, even if the Corbus 
standard applied to this case, sufficient evidence was still presented to convict 
Thompson of involuntary manslaughter. 
In homicide cases, the state must prove that a death occurred and that the 
defendant unlawfully caused that death. State v. Maxfield, 106 Idaho 206, 207, 677 
P.2d 519, 520 (Ct. App. 1984). Dr. Groben, a forensic pathologist with Ada County, 
determined that Mr. Blair's death was caused by "a penetrating near contact gunshot 
wound to the head." (Tr., p.557, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Blair received that gunshot wound from 
the firearm which Thompson operated in a reckless, negligent or careless manner by 
pulling it out, intentionally chambering a round and cocking it, and then pointing it in the 
direction of his passengers riding in the back of his pickup truck. 
Thompson acknowledges that his reckless, negligent or careless operation of his 
firearm in fact caused Mr. Blair's death. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) But so too, Thompson 
argues, did the group going out the night Mr. Blair died, Thompson purchasing a 
firearm, Mr. Blair's and Thompson's respective births, the invention of firearms, etc. 
(Id.) Thompson's argument misses the point: Going to a bar, purchasing or inventing 
firearms, and being born are not unlawful acts. The only unlawful act which produced 
Mr. Blair's death was Thompson's reckless, negligent or careless operation of his 
firearm. That Thompson's unlawful act alone did not produce all of the circumstances 
which lead to Mr. Blair's death does not prohibit the jury from concluding that 
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Thompson's unlawful act in fact produced Mr. Blair's death. Thompson is guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter. 
Even if this Court applied the Corbus standard to homicide cases, there was still 
sufficient evidence presented to convict Thompson. It is well-settled that civil "causation 
consists of actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 
P.3d at 401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). 
As noted above, Thompson acknowledges that his reckless, careless or negligent 
actions are an actual cause of Mr. Blair's death. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) He asserts, 
however, that those actions are not the true proximate cause of the homicide. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) 
The determination of proximate cause is a factual question. Corbus, 150 Idaho 
at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, 
In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the 
injury and manner of occurrence are so highly unusual "that a reasonable 
person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct 
might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." 
kl (citation omitted). When a person, let alone an intoxicated person, holds a loaded 
firearm and threatens to shoot others with it, it is reasonably foreseeable that someone 
may indeed be shot and killed. Under the standard articulated in Corbus, Thompson's 
behavior is the proximate cause of Mr. Blair's death. 
Thompson also argues that Mr. Blair's action of placing his mouth over the barrel 
of the gun is an intervening cause. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) Thompson's argument 
fails. Legally, that Mr. Blair also behaved stupidly in no way absolves Thompson of his 
criminal liability for his operation of a firearm in a reckless, negligent or careless manner 
which produced Mr. Blair's death. See Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606, 249 P.3d at 405 
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("Generally, the contributory negligence of the victim is not enough to relieve the 
defendant of criminal liability."). Factually, at most Mr. Blair's actions could be 
construed as the cause of his getting shot in the mouth; they are not, however, the 
cause of his getting shot. That was caused by Thompson's intentional acts of taking out 
a loaded gun, chambering a round, threatening his friends with it, and holding it pointed 
in their direction. A true intervening cause creates consequences which are 
extraordinary and unforeseeable. & A man getting shot when a belligerent drunk 
waives around a loaded handgun is neither extraordinary nor unforeseeable. 
Furthermore, the state presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that, 
not only did he introduce the loaded gun into the equation, Thompson in fact pulled the 
trigger. It is undisputed that Thompson held the cocked gun in his hand and that the 
gun fired. Ms. Jones testified that she did not see Mr. Blair touch the gun, let alone pull 
the trigger. (Tr., p.303, Ls.12-19.) By itself, that is sufficient for the jury to reasonably 
infer that Thompson, if unintentionally, pulled the trigger. But there was more: 
Recounting the incident, Ms. Jones described Thompson and Mr. Blair as "Two drunk, 
cocky guys. One trying to call the other's bluff." (Tr., p.313, L.5- p.314, L.18.) Based 
on that evidence, the jury could have also reasonably inferred that a drunk Thompson, 
not clearly considering the consequences of his actions, intentionally pulled the trigger 
to prevent a drunk Mr. Blair from "calling his bluff." 
To sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter the state is not required to 
show civil causation. Rather, the state must only show that an unlawful act committed 
by the defendant produced the victim's death. Even if the Court were to apply civil 
causation standards to this homicide, there was still sufficient evidence to convict 
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Thompson. Because the jury's verdict is supported by and consistent with substantial 
evidence, Thompson's claim that he must be acquitted despite overwhelming evidence 
that his reckless, careless or negligent behavior produced Mr. Blair's death must be 
rejected and his conviction of involuntary manslaughter affirmed. 
11. 
Thompson Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Court's Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Thompson argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 
sentence of 15 years with five years fixed on his conviction for involuntary manslaughter 
with a weapons enhancement, and by later denying his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.14-21.) Thompson has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's 
sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing A Sentence Of 15 
Years With Five Years Fixed Upon Thompson's Conviction For Involuntary 
Manslaughter 
Thompson argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, his sentence is 
excessive. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-19.) Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an 
appellant is required to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State 
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 
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Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, Thompson must show that his 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary 
objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 
728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal, with the 
presumption that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term 
of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In 
deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable 
sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Considering the nature of Thompson's crime, his sentence is not excessive. As 
explained by the district court, Thompson, after having consumed a substantial amount 
of alcohol, while behind the wheel of a moving vehicle, created a situation fraught with 
the highest danger by taking out a gun, chambering a round, and holding it ready to be 
fired without a safety engaged. (2/25/2013 Tr., p.123, Ls.1-4.) Thompson's actions 
created a huge risk not only for his passengers, but for other drivers, passersby, and 
homes along the road. (2/25/2013 Tr., p.123, Ls.4-7.) In the end one man, Mr. Blair, 
paid the ultimate price for Thompson's reckless, careless and negligent behavior. 
(2/25/2013 Tr., p.126, Ls.9-12.) The district court weighed these factors-"[t]he death; 
the intentional conduct; the creating of the incredibly lethal situation with a loaded-
cocked weapon being displayed"-and properly concluded that anything other than a 
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sentence of confinement "would depreciate the seriousness of what happened in this 
case." (2/25/2013 Tr., p.127, Ls.10-19.) 
On appeal, Thompson seeks to minimize his crimes, arguing that he is not really 
criminally culpable, but that Mr. Blair must bear blame as well. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-
19.) Thompson took out the gun; Thompson made sure the gun was loaded; Thompson 
cocked the gun; Thompson held the gun; Thompson's finger was on the trigger. 
Thompson is responsible and no one else. His continuing efforts to minimize his own 
criminal culpability by blaming his victim for his inexcusable conduct are outrageous. 
Thompson further asserts that the district court's sentence does not accomplish 
the goals of sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) He argues that he cannot be 
rehabilitated for this crime. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) As long as Thompson continues to 
shirk personal responsibility for his criminal actions and instead blame his victim, that is 
true, but it is hardly mitigating. Thompson also ignores the very real need to protect 
society from his reckless, careless and negligent conduct. Recklessly playing with 
loaded firearms while drunk, as Thompson did, is exceptionally dangerous under any 
circumstances, whether it produces death as in this case or any other number of 
injuries. The district court's sentence appropriately provides a measure of protection to 
the public from Thompson. 
Finally, Thompson argues that he has two children, is employable, and has the 
support of family. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-19.) None of these diminish the fact that 
Thompson killed a man. Because Thompson has failed to show that his sentence is 
excessive, he has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. His 
sentence should be affirmed. 
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D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Thompson's Rule 
35 Motion For Sentencing Leniency 
Thompson argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-21.) If a sentence is within 
applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for 
leniency, and the Court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, 
Thompson must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." 
~ Thompson failed to carry this burden. 
The additional information provided by Thompson in support of his Rule 35 
motion for reconsideration was an article in a newspaper showing a lesser sentence for 
what he asserted was a similar crime in a different case. (Motion for Rule 35 
(Augmentation).) Such comparative sentencing is contrary to Idaho precedent. As 
explained by the Court in State v. Pederson, 124 Idaho 179, 857 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 
1993), comparative sentencing is inappropriate because: 
It is well settled that not every offense in like category calls for identical 
punishment; there may properly be a variation in sentences between 
different offenders, depending on the circumstances of the crime and the 
character of the defendant in his or her individual case. 
124 Idaho at 183, 857 P .2d at 662. It is this very principle of discretion which allowed 
the district court to impose a sentence on Thompson that was less than the maximum 
authorized by law or less than greater sentences imposed in different cases. 
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Thompson's sentences were reasonable when imposed, were reasonable when 
he filed his Rule 35 motion, and remain reasonable now. Having failed to show an 
abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion, the order of the district court should 
be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Thompson's conviction and 
sentence, and the order denying his Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2014. 
(R~ENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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